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Abstract 
 
The armed conflict of Libya occurred in 2011 and the authoritarian government of Ghaddafi felt down. During the 
conflict serious violations of human rights and humanitarian rights law (IHL) occurred and both sides committed 
serious crimes included of willfull killings, rape, looting, torture and aarbitrary arrests. After the fall of Ghoddafi, a 
transitional government came to power in Libya that was known as the National Transitional Government of Libya 
(NTC). The Libyan NTC adopted amnesty laws and considered it as part of the transition of power from the previous 
government to the new one. This amnesty law was criticized by human rights organizations and human rights 
activists. In this article after providing a brief introduction to amnesty and introducing various types of it and 
contemplating on transitional justice, the NTC amnesty law will be examined.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After the fall of any authoritarian regime, 
the leader, elites and military forces who 
committed serious crimes such as torture, 
willful killings and looting should be 
punished. Sometimes, there are situations 
where the troops of the previous government 
will not give up on fear of retribution and 
continue to fight. In fact, fear of punishment 
is a serious impetus for continued 
insurgency and military killings.
1
 In such a 
situation, amnesty can be a solution to 
lasting peace. The problem is that, providing 
amnesty to law violators is against justice 
and the family of the victims will mostly fell 
unhappy with the amnesty laws. In other 
words, there is a conflict between amnesty 
and transitional justice.
2
  
 Against the abovesaid background, 
this manuscript examines the conflict 
between amnesty and traditional justice in 
the case of the Libyan amnesty law, the 
Libyan NTC Law No. 38. After the fall of 
Ghoddafi, a transitional government came to 
power in Libya that was known as the 
National Transitional Government of Libya 
(NTC). The Libyan NTC adopted NTC Law 
No. 38 as an amnesty law and considered it 
as part of the transition of power from the 
previous government to the new one. During 
the armed conflict in 2011, serious 
violations of human rights and humanitarian 
laws occurred and both sides of the armed 
conflict committed serious crimes included 
of willfull killing, rape, looting, torture and 
aarbitrary arrests. Under the Libyan amnesty 
law, these criminals may escape justice. 
Using qualitative and critical approach, this 
manuscript examine the relevant primary 
and secondary sources to provide an analysis 
on the concepts of transitional justice and 
amnesty under international law before 
critically examine the legitimacy of the 
Libyan amnesty law.   
 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
Transitional justice means judicial and non-
judicial measures aimed at remedying 
human rights violations.
3
 Measures taken by 
transitional justice include prosecution of 
the law violators, fact finding commission 
and various types of compensation. 
Transitional justice is crucial because it 
creates social security and trust. The more 
bloody a government falls, the less likely it 
is that a democratic government come to 
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power. Put differently, transitional justice 
increase the smooth shifting of power and 
increases the likelihood of formation of a 
democratic government.  
Transitional justice is not necessarily 
about criminal prosecutions but also 
preventive measures and root finding 
procedures. Ian Bremmer in his book 
entitles as “The J Curve” writes, the 
movement of an authoritarian government 
from the left side of the curve to the right 
side, heavily depends on the adopted 
policies by the transitional forces and many 
other factors. On the left side of the 
Bremmer J Curve, there are stable 
authoritarian governments and on the right 
side, there are stable democracies. Any State 
during its process from the left side of the J 
Curve i.e. authoritarian regime to the right 
side i.e. formation of a democratic 
government, should tolerate internal unrests 
and chaotic situations. There is no guarantee 
that suffering an internal chaos will be able 
to form a democratic government after the 
chaos. One of the factors that may drive the 
table from left to the right is transitional 
justice.
4
  
The aim of transitional justice is 
protecting and promoting human rights. 
However, under the principle of transitional 
justice, law violators among governmental 
and military personnel sometimes are 
dismissed and sometimes are given a second 
chance. Transitional justice is also seen as a 
vehicle in providing amnesty to human 
rights abusers or law violators. Providing 
amnesty to law violators is against the rule 
of law and perpetuates human rights abuses 
in the new government.  
 
CONCEPT OF AMNESTY 
 
Various types of amnesty were recognised 
given the fact that the scope and process for 
amnesty depended closely on the 
circumstances of the State and the relevant 
peace negotiations. Each amnesty process 
may have a positive or negative effect on 
democratization of the respective State. 
According to the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), 
amnesty includes legal measures that 
prevent the commencement of any criminal 
prosecution against certain groups or 
individuals or that will nullify previous legal 
liabilities.
5
 Different types of amnesties are 
as follows: 
 
i. If violators of human rights adopt 
amnesty laws to protect themselves 
from liability, that is called “self-
amnesty”; 
ii. If amnesty laws are not adopted by 
law violators, but groups and 
individuals that violated international 
human rights law (IHRL) and 
international humanitarian law (IHL) 
are exempted from liability or 
victims are deprived of the 
opportunity to provide the facts on 
the violations, that is called “blanket 
amnesty”; 
iii. If the law violators are exempted 
from prosecution on condition that 
they coordinate and provide 
information and facts to disclose the 
committed violations, that is known 
as “conditional amnesty”; 6 
iv. If the laws and measures of a State 
are adopted is such a way that they 
block any prosecution for the 
perpetrated crimes without any 
explicit refrence to “amnesty”, that is 
“de facto amnesty”;7  
v. If the amnesty law is perfect but the 
authorities interpret it in such a way 
that it is inconsistent with the IHRL 
obligations of the State, that is 
known as “disguised amnesty.”8  
 
Argentina in 1983 adopted a self-
amnesty law, according to which all the 
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penal actions related to unlawful acts 
committed for the purpose of preventing or 
put an end to terrorist activities between 
1973 and 1982 is discontinued.
9
 Thus, the 
relevant law violators escaped sanctions or 
punishments for their actions. As one may 
notice, self-amnesty is adopted unilaterally 
by governments who have committed 
international crimes and violated human 
rights in large scales. This type of amnesty 
is regarded illegal and illegitimate.
10
 Self-
amnesties in the inter-American system is 
considered violation of the American 
Convention of Human Rights 1969.
11
  
The best example for blanket 
amnesty is amnesty law adopted on May 7, 
2009 by Joseph Kabila of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. According to 
International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ), this law is rewarding the violence 
and scoring the crime perpetrators thus, 
granting large blanket amnesty is 
unacceptable.
12
 Blanket amnesty creates 
temporary peace but in long run causes a 
more wide scale bloodshell. If amnesty is 
provided in large scale and includes many 
people, it is a kind of bonus for law violators 
and those who have resorted to violence. 
Arguably, this type of amnesty is rewarding 
the violence. In other words the scope of 
amnesty should be as little as possible and 
never excludes international crimes. 
Adopting blanket amnesty prevents the 
discovery of truth and holds off confession 
for commiting wrongdoing by 
perpetrators.
13
 This is because, to certain 
extend pleading guilty itself is a form of 
punishment.  
  An example of conditional amnesty 
is the amnesty adopted by the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). According to the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 
1995, specific conditions such as personal 
attendance of the amnesty seeker, details of 
the committed acts and existence of political 
motivation should be met before granting 
amnesty. 
14
 The problem with this amnesty 
law was that, every applicants could easily 
tailor his/her story to meet the conditions 
and were hardly verified.  
Human rights organizations normally 
objected to providing amnesty to law 
violators and they try to take measures to 
prosecute and punish violators of human 
rights. Human rights advocates believe that 
amnesty is not a good solution for dealing 
with human rights vilators.
15
 In African 
States, the insurgents condition their 
participation in peace gentitiations and 
disarmament to amnesty.  
Under the IHRL, it is impossible to 
provide amnesty for war crimes, genocide, 
crimes against humanity or in such a way as 
to deprive victims of effective remedies or 
ban any investigation into the crimes.
16
 It is 
a fact that some crimes such as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, wilful killing, 
torture and enforced disappearance are not 
forgivable.
17
 One may trace the source of the 
prohibition against the granting of amnesty 
for serious crimes and violations of IHL and 
IHRL, namely the Security Council 
Resolution No. 955 and Article 1 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
The preamble of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 1998 
also reiterates the termination of the practice 
of providing impunity to those who have 
committed the most serious crimes. The 
American Commission of Human Rights 
announced the issue of the public amnesty 
granted by the government of El Salvador as 
a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocol 
II 1977.
18
 
However, on the other hand 
Paragraph 5 of Article 6 of the Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 obligates parties to grant amnesty 
during internal armed conflicts, either 
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through legislation or agreements between 
the parties to the armed conflict. Paragraph 5 
provides: At the end of hostilities, the 
authorities in power shall endeavour to grant 
the broadest possible amnesty to persons 
who have participated in the armed conflict, 
or those deprived of their liberty for reasons 
related to the armed conflict, whether they 
are interned or detained. The Security 
Council
19
 and the General Assembly
20
 of the 
United Nations (UN), the European Union 
(EU) and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) have also made 
recommendations on the granting of 
amnesty after the end of armed conflicts. 
Moreover, according to the customary IHL, 
after hostilities, the parties to an armed 
conflict should do their best to grant 
amnesty to individual perpetrators in the 
internal war.
21
  
In conclusion, amnesty is not just a 
legal debate but also a political one. In some 
instances amnesty leads to a stable peace 
and sometimes creates a barrier to peace. 
Providing wide scale of amnesty may cause 
a sense of injustice and increases the sense 
of revenge. Amnesty is not forgiving the 
wrongdoer because, the amnesty grantor is 
not qualified to grant forgiveness and it is 
only the victim that can forgive the 
perpetraror. Amnesty also means that 
compensation should not be criminal. 
Ideally, amnesty should be provided in a 
democratic process and it should be 
provided in a situation that a democratic 
government is coming to power. If an 
authotarian regime comes to power and 
provides amnesty for its own forces, this 
amnesty lacks legitimacy. Moreoever, 
amnesty should not cause the crime remains 
uncompensated; it can also have 
administrative and civil aspects.  
 
 
 
LEGITIMACY OF AMNESTY UNDER 
LIBYAN NTC LAW NO 38 
 
The Libyan NTC granted amnesty through a 
legislation, but the problem was that it 
granted amnesty on certain conditions, to 
those who had committed crimes.
22
 Such an 
act is in violation of the obligation to 
investigate and prosecute. Ideally, the 
granting of amnesty to members of armed 
groups in an internal armed conflict paves 
the way towards the peace and stability of 
the country. Armed groups lay down their 
weapons if they are sure that after the peace 
agreement(s), they will be immune from 
prosecution. In this situation, the de facto 
government is in a dilemma because, on the 
one hand, granting amnesty to those who 
perpetrated crimes during an armed conflict 
is in violation of IHRL and IHL,
23
 as the 
IHL and IHRL instruments request that State 
Parties ensure that violators are punished 
through the establishment of appropriate 
criminal proceedings.
24
 On the other hand, if 
it refrains from granting amnesty to the 
members of the armed group, there will be 
no lasting peace. It should be noted that 
there is no contradiction between providing 
reparation to the victims of crimes and 
providing amnesty so that the combatants 
put down their arms and submit to official 
forces i.e. the army and the police. 
  On 2nd May 2012, the Libyan NTC 
passed Law No. 38 which provides that 
there should be no penalty on the military 
personnel of civil actions committed during 
the internal armed conflict of Libya by 
revolutionaries “with the goal of promoting 
the revolution.”25  Literally, this meant that 
those revolutionaries who committed serious 
crimes could walk away free. Ironically, the 
amnesty law provides immunity for those 
who committed crimes against humanity and 
war crimes but did not establish any fact-
finding process. The passing of Law No. 38 
also been seen as an indicator that members 
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both sides of the Libyan internal armed 
conflict had committed violations of IHL 
and IHRL or else there would have been no 
need for amnesty.
26
  
Moreover, according to an 
organisation, Lawyers for Justice in Libya 
(LFJL), Law No. 38 contradicts the NTC 
Declaration issued on 3 August 2011 that is 
the source of its legitimacy. The wording of 
Law No. 38 is vague and may lead to 
arbitrary detention.
27
 Human Rights Watch 
calls Law No. 38 the “victor`s justice.”28 
The CILa criticized the amnesty law by 
saying that although Law No. 38 mentions 
on the possibility of reconciliation between 
the criminals and the victims, in reality the 
granting of amnesty may prevent the victims 
from getting compensation.
29
 It is also urged 
for the NTC in making sure that the process 
of amnesty is done according to 
international law and that all those who 
committed serious crimes during the armed 
conflict were held accountable.
30
 Finally, it 
should be emphasised that Heller 
categorized Law No. 38 as a blanket 
amnesty.
31
 Despite of its legal implication in 
the domestic context, Law No. 38 however 
did not prevent international courts such as 
the ICC from prosecuting perpetrators for 
serious violations of IHRL during the armed 
conflict of Libya. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Libyan NTC passed Law No. 38 and 
provided amnesty to those who committed 
war crimes, and the regulations were so 
vague as to lead to arbitrary detentions. The 
attitude of the NTC towards those who 
committed war crimes during the internal 
armed conflict of 2011 was discriminative; it 
provided amnesty for the thuwar but, on the 
other hand, deprived the Gaddafi loyalists of 
some of their fundamental rights, such as 
visits by their family while in custody. Saif 
al Islam was specifically arrested arbitrarily 
and was also deprived of family visits. The 
type of the amnesty provided by the Libyan 
NTC was “self-amnesty” arguably can also 
be categorised as “disguised amnesty.” It is 
suggested for the Libyan authorities to adopt 
transitional justice prodeedures and render 
the IHRL and IHL violaters for adjudication 
before the international courts, tribunals or 
hybrid courts.  
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